Kenyan Politics: An Introduction
Postcolonial
Kenya has seen a significant amount of development, both politically and
economically, since its independence in 1963. Starting with the presidency of
Jomo Kenyatta, the nation prospered -- experiencing economic growth of at least
5% for over a decade (Barkan, 2004). The civil service was highly regarded,
well paid, and the prospect of corruption was hardly visible. Unfortunately,
the presidential succession by Daniel Arap Moi did not account for the same
positive conditions. After Moi took power in 1978, many governmental entities
languished, due to his repressive regime. By the 1990’s, the civil service
declined, the judicial system lost much of its power, and the economy sank,
with poverty rates rising 8% (Barkan, 2004). When Mwai Kibaki began his
presidency in 2002, Kenya was at one of its worst places in history, putting
Kibaki in a position to either make significant changes or keep Kenya in its
destructive state.
Unfortunately,
along with political and economic instability comes an increase in crime and
disorder. East Africa, as a whole, is a region of high crime rates due to a
number of factors, several of which have no feasible short-term solutions. As
of present day, Kenya is rated by the U.S. Department of State as Critical
in terms of both terrorism and crime, making the United States Embassy in
Nairobi the fourth largest in the world. The porous borders between countries
as well as the extensive coastline make it difficult to accurately track and
pursue criminal activity. The median age in East Africa is between16 and 19
years old, which is directly in the center of the average criminal demographic
worldwide. This means that there is little likelihood for a decline in crime
rates anytime in the near future (UNODC, 2009). In addition to the above
factors that offer little hope for crime experts worldwide, there has been a
significant decrease in active policing and law enforcement in Kenya, while criminal
behavior is steadily increasing. Recent United Nations surveys in Kenya have
shown that over half of the population worries about crime constantly and
roughly 75% feel unsafe while at home (UN - Habitat, 2002). The lack of
training and low pay for the Kenyan police causes a considerable level of
corruption and a general lack of aggressive policing, with 98% of Kenyans
believing there is some level of corruption in the force (UN - Habitat, 2002).
This research article discusses the elements of crime and policing in Kenya
along with their relationship to globalization, development, and
sustainability.
Law and Order in Kenya
The
criminal justice system in Kenya is still a work in progress. Initially created
during Colonial rule, the system merged British Colonial law with the ideals
thought to be important to native Kenyans at the time. After the Mau-Mau
uprising against the British in the 1950s, many Kenyans were determined to
create a crime policy that coexisted with their tribal lifestyle. With 78
percent of Kenyans living in rural areas as of the year 2009 (Ministry of Land,
2009), it is unfeasible to expect a formal police and justice system throughout
the entire country. Within many provinces, there are districts led by Chiefs
and District Officers. These elected officials act as government
representatives and handle many of the criminal matters without any formal
involvement from larger governmental entities.
The Kenyan law enforcement network is split into several sectors
all comprising the police force. Since the last major reorganization in 1953,
the Kenyan Police Force, under the direction of the Police Commissioner, is
comprised of the Regular Police, General Service Unit, Criminal
Investigative Department, National Security Intelligence Service and
the Administrative Police. Each with specific goals and functions, the
Swahili phrase Utamishi Kwa Wote (service to all) acts as the guiding
motto for officers nationwide (Maina et al, 2004). The Regular Police conduct
day-to-day street operations and act as the visible face for all Kenyans to
see. The General Service Unit (the main firearm carrying division of the
police) takes part in major uprisings and events and is, according to a
prominent Kenyan figure in the Kibera Slum, “feared by nearly everyone”
(Anonymous, personal statement, 2010). The Criminal Investigative Department
(CID) performs many undercover operations and acts as a very close liaison to
the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. The Administrative Police, given the task of
securing the borders of Kenya, work in many rural areas on the outskirts of the
country, with a larger concentration to the north. Following the 1998 attacks
on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), the National
Security Intelligence Service was created. This unit acts as an intelligence
gathering service and does not have any significant face-to-face contact with
the Kenyan people.
The
above divisions of the Kenyan Police Force all face numerous challenges when
dealing with crime in Kenya. For one, the base monthly salary of a Kenyan
police officer is eleven thousand shillings [roughly 143 USD] (Mukinda, 2010).
The mere lack of assets and unsustainable lifestyle inherently breeds
corruption. Kenya, as a whole, rates in the top 20% of corrupt countries
worldwide as per the latest Corruption Perception Index (Ndegwa, 2009). Within
Kenya itself, the highest rating corrupt body is the police force, holding an
aggregate index of 57 percent (Kenya Bribery Index, 2008). This significant
level of distrust between the public and the police drastically increases the
challenges of effective crime control. Due to Kenya’s struggling economy, there
is simply not enough money going towards policing and security. The ratio of
police to citizens throughout Africa is roughly half of that in North America
and Europe, with rates of 180 per 100,000 compared with 346 and 325
respectively (UNODC, 2009). The subsequent consequences of an understaffed and
struggling police force are a lack of training, poor equipment, and general
incompetence (Maina et al, 2004).
Moving
forward in the last several years, the Kenyan Police Force has embarked on a
mission to improve public relations and operations through community policing,
increased qualifications, and professional training programs instituted by
foreign governments and NGOs. Assistant Commissioner of Police Tom Omani stated
that the major turning point in policing began in 1998 following the Kenya
terrorist attack, however, gained the most momentum after Kibaki took power. In
Mr. Omani’s opinion, the most important change to the criminal justice system
in Kenya is the community policing initiative, which asks for input and help
from Kenyan citizens. While it is a slow process to regain the trust of most Kenyans,
Omani is confident that crime cannot be fought by police alone and that it is
prerequisite of controlling crime to have help from the community (Omani,
personal statement, 2010).
Analysis of Crime and Terrorism
Trends
in crime throughout East Africa, specifically Kenya, are frequently evolving,
giving law enforcement the difficult task of remaining vigilant. With
advancements in global technology comes the emergence of criminal activity. In
terms of Kenya, the major problems include: Terrorism, maritime piracy,
human/drugs/arms trafficking, and cyber crime. Unfortunately, most law
enforcement officials worldwide do not see solutions to any of these problems
in the near future. For one, a vast majority of the responsibility for all
crime in Kenya can be attributed to the porous borders that surround the
country. Surrounding Kenya is the failed state of Somalia, war-torn Sudan, and
crime-ridden Ethiopia and Uganda. Without proper border control, there is
simply no realistic way to create a secure country. The U.S. Legal Attaché in
Nairobi makes it very clear that there is no way to accurately assume the
number of people crossing through the Somalia-Kenya border. However, he would
estimate that 100,000 undocumented foreigners make entry into or exit Kenya
every day (Legal Attaché, personal statement, 2010). This figure is
exceptionally upsetting when it is considered that Somalia houses al-Shabab, a
terrorist group with self-declared ties to al-Qaeda. The presence of al-Qaeda
in Kenya is directly responsible for the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in
Nairobi, therefore, leaving an innate hatred of the terrorist group for nearly
every Kenyan.
Besides
the 1998 terrorist attacks that left over 200 people dead in Kenya, there was
another significant attack that occurred in 2002. The Kikambala bombing in
Mombasa was equally as gruesome and created an even more substantial cause for
concern among Kenyans and law enforcement officials worldwide. A
pro-Palestinian organization from Lebanon planted a bomb at an Israeli owned
hotel in Mombasa killing and injuring dozens of people. In addition, two
missiles were shot from land into the air and narrowly missed an Israeli
charter plane. The missiles were neither used nor manufactured in Kenya,
therefore, only could have entered the country through illegal means (The
Threat from Portable Missiles, 2002). The international response was firm and
expected but it was later made public that the Intelligence Communityworldwide
had knowledge of an imminent terrorist attack and failed to act on the
information (McDermott, 2002).
According
to an official at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, the biggest consequence of a
terrorist attack, besides the obvious loss of life, is the impact on tourism.
As the second largest source of income for Kenya (after agriculture), “the
tourism industry in Kenya has suffered [over the last decade] from the issuance
of travel advisories by foreign governments” (Onyango, 2010). Every subsequent
attack that takes place in Kenya further destroys the tourism market and makes
surrounding nations that much more enjoyable (RSO, personal statement, 2010).
Most Kenyans, regardless of ethnicity or religion, understand these
consequences and justifiably want solutions to the issue of terrorism. It is
important to note that the embarrassment felt by Kenyans is universal but
especially deep for Muslims. The Islamic community in Kenya is generally
conservative but seldom fundamentalist. As a spokesperson for the Islamic
population in the Coastal Province, Alawy Abzein reiterates that Muslims
cooperate with the Government of Kenya to help catch those responsible for
terrorist attacks (Abzein, personal statement, 2010) for instance kenya as a countryn is yet to come to terms of election either,this may be attributed to collapse or poor structures put in place or someone is sleepeing on the job post election mayem. Reliable information was
given to the Government of Kenya in 2008 regarding the whereabouts of Fazul Abdullah-Mohammed
[the suspected mastermind behind the U.S. Embassy bombings], however, he
narrowly escaped the search by Kenyan officials and is believed to be currently
living in Somalia.
Even
if suspected terrorists are found, Kenya has no anti-terrorism laws in its
judicial code. This means that Kenyan prosecutors must charge suspects with
substantially less serious offenses, making it both difficult for a conviction
and severely lenient even with a guilty verdict. Seven of the subjects arrested
as a result of the Kikambala bombing were not tried successfully the first time
in court (RSO, personal statement, 2010). This could be attributed to both
ineffective legislation and the lack of competent prosecutors. Most criminal
prosecutions in Kenya are handled by Police Prosecutors who have minimal legal
training. The system is based on British ideology from before Kenya’s
independence and unfortunately, no longer works successfully given the present
day environment. Kenya, as a whole, has an average of 74 public prosecutors
countrywide leaving a significant gap between the many trials and the extent of
manpower. According to legal expert Robert Bowman from the U.S. Department of
Justice, such a small number of legitimate prosecutors creates an abundance of
problems ranging from corruption to poorly handled trials and basic
incompetence (Bowman, personal statement, 2010). Given the wide range of
offenses throughout Kenya, conducting specialized training in emerging crimes
for Kenyan officials would have the potential to make a profound difference in
the criminal justice system both in terms of logistics and economics.
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